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Abstract 
This paper examines the high degree of success of several systems of rural financial 
intermediaries in Indonesia, in terms both of self-sustainability and outreach. These systems 
have provided credit and deposit services, profitably and at low transaction costs, to large 
numbers of very small individual clients. This generalized success reflects both a hospitable 
environment for financial intermediation and, particularly, the elements of an effective 
organizational design, in reflection of an underlying concern with institutional viability. This 
design has provided both the incentives and opportunities for successful behavior. The 
provision of financial services to marginal clientele depends on the solution of the paradox 
resulting from those agents with inexpensive access to information and monitoring 
mechanisms not having enough resources or being too risk averse to locally provide 
sufficient credit, while those with the resources have no access to the required information 
and contract enforcement tools. Regulatory constraints may make this situation worse. The 
design of Indonesian locally-operated financial institutions offers a solution to this paradox. 
Character-based lending that relies on local agents is comparatively inexpensive. With the 
recruitment of local agents for lending, however, the information/ enforcement problem 
becomes an agency problem. In Indonesia, the solution has been a system of compatible 
incentives (performance-based remunerations and efficiency wages), coupled with the 
verification of profits. In practice, managers have been made co-owners. This requires that 
managers possess discretionary powers over performance-relevant variables. Thus, no loan 
targeting exists and financial policies, while not uniform, have been adequate to protect 
institutional viability. The one-time subsidies implicit in seed capital and start-up loans to 
these intermediaries have not created dependency on outside funds, while the extent of the 
interventions has been proportional to the magnitude of the problems to be solved, rather 
than being massive undertakings with large fixed-cost structures. Gradual growth, by trial 
and error, has been a good approach to institution building. These organizations have been 
credibly committed to collect loans, while borrowers have pledged their (valuable) 
reputation as collateral. Traditional hierarchical structures (village chief) have been used 
for contract enforcement. The chief may also be operating as an indigenous credit rating 
agency. The lessons learned in Indonesia shed light on successful institution building 
elsewhere. 
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I. Introduction 
The high degree of success of several rural financial intermediaries (RFis) in 
Indonesia has attracted a great deal of interest. The performance of the Bank Rakyat 
Indonesia~ unit desa (BRI~unit desa) and Badan Kredit Kecamatan (BKK) systems has been 
well documented. Among others, Patten and Rosengard (1991) and Yaron (1992) are 
excellent studies of these two RFis. These evaluations provide evidence of the compara-
tively strong success of these organizations. Y aron, for instance, reports that the BKK and 
the BRI-unit desa have attained higher levels of sustainability -as shown by subsidy 
dependence indexes and other indicators- than other RFis widely regarded as successful, 
such as the Grameen Bank in Bangladesh and the Bank for Agriculture and Agricultural 
1 Paper prepared for the conference -Finance 2000. Financial Markets and Institutions 
in Developing Countries: Reassessing Perspectives: held in Washington, D.C. on May 27-
28, sponsored by The Ohio State University, the Institute for Policy Reform, and the Agency 
for International Development. 
2 Graduate Research Associate and Professor of Agricultural Economics and Economics 
at The Ohio State University, respectively. Research in Indonesia was funded by 
Development Alternatives, Inc. through the Financial Institutions Development Project. The 
authors have also received support from the Cooperative Agreement on Financial Resource 
Management (FIRM) between The Ohio State University and the Agency for International 
Development. The authors are particularly grateful to David Lucock for his guidance when 
they visited Indonesia and for his comments. 
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Cooperatives (BAAC) in Thailand. 3 Patten and Rosengard found that the long-term loan 
loss ratio for the BRI-unit desa and the BKK was only 1.35 and 1.98 percent, respectively.4 
Such loan recovery rates have few, if any, counterparts in rural financial markets in 
developing countries. Both systems have been profitable. 
In general, successful RFis represent the exception rather than the norm. Several 
other RFI systems in Indonesia have shown, however, a success comparable to that of the 
BKK and the BRI-unit desa. Gonzalez-Vega and Chaves (1992) document the performance 
of less well-known systems, several of which have received technical assistance from the 
Financial Institutions Development Project (FID) sponsored by the Agency for International 
Development (AID); namely: theLembagaPerkreditanDesa (LPD) ofBali, theBadanKredit 
Kecamatan of Central Java (BKK-CT) and of South Kalimantan (BKK-SK), and the Kredit 
Usaha Rakyat Kecil (KURK) of East Java The authors observed the operations of the 
Badon Kredit Desa (BKD) in Central Java, and the Lumbung Pitih Nagari (LPN) in West 
Sumatra, which appeared to have achieved a reasonable degree of success as well.5 
These systems are collections of semi-autonomous organizations or units, established 
with heavy government support. The units are formally owned by the corresponding 
3 The subsidy dependence index (SDI) is an indicator of self-sustainability developed 
by Y aron (1992) that measures the percentage increase in lending interest rates required 
to compensate for the elimination of the subsidies received by the RFI. 
4 The long-term loss ratio is given by the cumulative arrears plus cumulative write-offs 
as a proportion of the cumulative amount due, measured over an extended period of time. 
The figures reported by Patten and Rosengard correspond to 1972 through 1987. 
5 For an additional evaluation of the performance of some of these systems see 
Gonzalez Vega (1982), Goldmark and Lucock (1988), and Rhyne (1991). 
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provincial government (BKK.-CJ, BKK-SK, KURK), the village dwellers (LPD, BKD), or 
their clients (LPN). Not only have demonstration effects been strong across systems, but 
the approach of these organizations has been imitated by some private banks, such as the 
Bank Sampoerna International of East Java, which has developed a network of about 50 
units, chartered independently, to successfu.lly provide similar rural financial services. 
II. Successful Rural Financial Intermediaries 
Any examination of the success of a RFI must include an explicit statement of the 
objective that the organization is supposed to achieve. We basically adopt the criteria 
suggested by Y aron (1992) to judge success. The first criterion is self-sustainability. This 
requires that the RFI -just as any other organization in the market-- be able to generate 
enough income to cover at least the opportunity cost of all the factors of production and 
assets (e.g., funds) under its command, while being able to honor all the contractual 
obligations implied by its liabilities. This is a sufficient condition for the maintenance of the 
real value of the organization's loan portfolio. The second criterion is the number of clients 
served and the quality of the services provided by the organization. This is an outreach 
objective. A large number of Indonesian RFis have achieved substantial success from the 
perspective of these criteria. The most salient indicators of these accomplishments are 
briefly reported below. 
(a) Quality of Services 
The quality of financial services is reflected in the transaction costs incurred by the 
customers of RFis. In the case of Indonesia, such costs have been comparatively low as a 
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result of several factors. First, the organizations have been designed to provide their 
services where the costumers are. These RFis are either located at the village level or have 
developed ambulatory banking services to serve customers there. Table 1 shows that eight 
RFI systems operate, altogether, almost 13,000 units and village posts. They are particularly 
numerous in the densely populated provinces of Java and Bali. 
All the steps necessary to complete a financial transaction are undertaken locally. 
-
In most cases, the borrower does not have to leave her own village. Further, local 
decisionm.aking and character-based lending (no collateral is required) allow for the rapid 
disbursement of loans. Most of the time the funds are available when needed, with no 
particular restrictions on use. 
Second, comparatively low transaction costs have resulted as well from the fact that 
loans are granted on an individual basis. Borrowers are not required to form groups in 
order to provide joint liability and implicit monitoring activities. Loans given to groups 
impose, ceteris paribus, higher transaction costs on individual borrowers, as the formation 
of the group itself and the implicit risk-sharing and opportunities for moral hazard require 
significant bargaining and monitoring efforts on the part of group members. The use of 
local information and mechanisms for enforcement as key components in the design of these 
RFis implies that group formation as a requirement for lending would be redundant, while 
this approach spares borrowers of potentially high transaction costs. Moreover, given highly 
individualized demands for credit and deposit services, the provision of individual financial 
services may be welfare-improving for the borrowers. 
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(b) Loan Portfolios and Deposit Mobilization 
Compared to other developing countries, the numbers of institutions, units, and 
clients reached are large and the funds mobilized substantial. Whole financial systems have 
been established, not just pilot projects that reach small numbers of people. Table 2 
presents selected indicators of size for these RFis. The largest, the BRI-unit desa system, 
had a loan portfolio equivalent to US$ 738 million. In comparison, the other systems are 
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smaller, but still large relative to programs for poor borrowers in other countries. The BRI-
unit desa system had mobilized an impressive US$ 1.3 billion of voluntary deposits. 
Although less substantial, the savings mobilized by the other systems are significant 
compared to their loan portfolios. 
Table 2. Indonesia: Indicators of Size for Selected Rural Financial Intermediaries. 
December, 1991. 
Type Loans Deposits Number of Number of 
Outstanding Outstanding Borrowers Depositorsb 
(billion Rp. )a (billion Rp. )a (000) (000) 
LPD 18.8 14.7 94 204 
KURKC 10.3 2.6 171 177 
BKK-CJ 43.6 7.7 564 496 
BKK-SK 1.3 0.6 14 n.a. 
LPN 3.7 2.0 19 57 
BKPD-LPK 74.0 44.9 218 405 
BRI-unit desa 1,476.0 2,542.0 1,900 8,500 
BKD 56.0 2.0 1,073 235 
Source: Compiled by the authors from reports of the Financial Institutions 
Development (FID) Project and the Bank Rakyat Indonesia. 
For the names of institutional types, see Table 1. 




The exchange rate was about Rp. 2,000 for U.S. dollar. 
Corresponds to voluntary depositors. 
Corresponds to March, 1992. 
These RFis serve, altogether, over four million people with credit services. In 
interesting counterpoint, over ten million savers use the depositing services of these RFis. 
Thus, a critical observation from Table 2 is that deposit services are more important, in 
terms of the number of customers (about two-and-a-half times) and of the absolute amounts 
involved, than credit services. In the aggregate, the deposit balances (Rp. 2,807 billion, 
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equivalent to US$ 1.4 billion) are larger than loans outstanding (Rp. 1,967 billion, equivalent 
to almost one billion in US dollars). While this result is influenced by the large amount of 
voluntary savings mobilized by the BRI-unit desa system, it reflects a substantial demand for 
deposit facilities in the rural areas of Indonesia. 
-
Table 3 shows the average number of borrowers and of depositors per office. There 
is a wide range of the number of borrowers served per unit. The lowest corresponds to the 
LPN (98 borrowers). This is consistent with the client-owned nature of these RFis, which 
rely heavily on closeness among their members. At the other extreme of the spectrum one 
finds that the keca:rnatan-level offices of the BKK-0 system reached the largest number of 
clients per unit (1,105 borrowers). This is consistent with the fact that the BKK use, as a 
credit allocation mechanism, a system of village posts, which cover a number of villages and 
thus a larger number of borrowers with only one BKK per keca:rnatan. The KURK, with 
the ~cond largest number of borrowers per unit (770), also operates posts at the desa level. 
The BKK and KURK village posts are similar, in several respects, to the BKD. They 
operate only during certain days of the week and their services are focused on a very small 
geographical area. 
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Table 3. Indonesia: Number of Borrowers and Depositors per RFI Office and 
Average Loan and Deposit Size. 
December, 1991. 
Type Average Average Average Average 
Number of Number of Loan Deposit/ 
Borrowers Depositors Outstanding Savings 
per Office8 per Office8 (000 Rp.}8 (000 Rp.)b 
LPD 148 323 200.0 72.0 
KURK.c,d 770 797 61.0 14.7 
BKK-CJC 1,105 972 77.0 15.5 
LPN 98 295 191.0 35.0 
BKPD 668 1,242 340.0 110.0 
BRI-unit desa 591 2,647 1,250.0 299.0 
BKD 268 58 52.0 8.5 
Source: Compiled by the authors from reports of the Financial Institutions 
Development (FID) Project and the Bank Rakyat Indonesia. 





This resulted from dividing the total number of clients by the correspond-
ing number of units in each system. Comparisons must be made with 
caution. For example, the average numbers for the KURK. and BKK. 
systems correspond to the kecamatan-based (sub-district) number of 
offices and not to the village posts. Comparisons among these systems 
and the BKD would thus require the use of data based on village posts. 
The exchange rate was bout Rp. 2,000 for U.S. dollar. 
Refers to the offices based at the kecamatan level. 
Corresponds to March, 1992. 
(c) Very Small Clients 
Although the diverse clientele and market niches served by these RFI systems is 
reflected by differences in the average size of loans and deposits, they are mostly reaching 
the poor. On the larger side, the average BRI-unit desa loan was equivalent to US$ 625. 
This average loan was, however, 24 times larger than loans granted by the BKD, for an aver-
age of only US$ 26. Loan size at the remaining RFis was well below that at the BRI-unit 
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desa, as some of these systems reached deeper toward the village level. The average deposit 
size varied significantly across RFis, as well. The BRI-unit desa mobilized the largest 
deposits (US$ 150 on the average), while the BKD mobilized the smallest (US$ 425). 
(d) Profitable Organizations 
Most of the RFI systems earned accounting profits when their units are 
consolidated.6 Table 4 shows the net profits, average equity, and return on equity for five 
of the RFI systems. All these systems earned comparatively high rates of return on equity. 
The highest corresponded to Bali's LPD (54.2 percent), and the lowest to Central Java's 
BK.K (13 percent). These RFis have been able to reach large numbers of the rural poor 
and still remain financially viable (profitable). This is the mark of their achievement. 
Table 4. Indonesia: Consolidated Return on Equity for Selected Rural Financial 
Intermediary Systems. 
December, 1989. 
Type Net Profits Average Return on 
(Million Rp.) Equity Equity 
(Million Rp.) (percentage) 
LPD 674.0 1,243 54.2 
KURK 806.9 1,602.8 50.3 
BKK-CJ 1,700 13,022 13.0 
LPN 79.6 391.1 20.3 
BRI-unit desa 37,000 97,000 38.1 
Source: Computed by the authors from data in the corresponding financial 
statements. 
6 Although accounting profits are not the most appropriate measure for self-sustainability, 
we use them as a proxy. For a discussion of the shortcomings of accounting profits as a 
measure of self-sustainability, see Y aron (1992). 
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The profitability of these organizations has reflected their financial policies. 
Although comparisons of effective interest rates show a wide range, they all charge 
sufficiently high rates, positive in real terms, to cover most, if not all, costs and risks (Table 
5). Again, the BRI-unit desa are at one end of the spectrum, by charging the lowest 
effective rates (31.5 percent per year),while the highest rates (84.4 percent) are charged by 
the BKD, KURK, and BKK. This contrast was not surprising, as the BRI-unit desa supply 
larger loans and require collateral from their borrowers. 
Table 5. Indonesia: Typical Terms at Selected Rural Financial Intermediaries. 
December, 1991. 
Credit Services Deposit Services 
Type Most Common Most Common Compulsory Collateral Range of Nominal Savings/ Effective Rates Repayment Savings Required Rates on Savings Loans 
(percentage)• Term (weeks) Required (percentage) 
LPD 53.6 43 yes no 12-24 0.78 
KURK 84.4 12 yes no 12 0.22 
BKK-CT 84.4 12 yes no 12-15 0.18 
LPN 38.5-54.8 24 yes no 0-24 0.54 
BKPD-LPK 59.3 26 yes no 12-24 0.60 
BRI-unit desa 31.5 n.a. no yes 12-22 1.72 
BKD 84.4 12 yes no 15 0.03 
Source: Computed by the authors from data in the corresponding financial statements. 
This represents the internal rate of return of the most frequently observed aedit contract. The 
assumptions are that the intermediaries reinvest in similar contracts all the cash flows generated by 
the contract, immediately after payments are received (there are no idle cash balances), that there 
are no arrears on these cash flows, and that returns are compounded instantaneously. These 
assumptions are necessary to compare pricing policies, given the great diversity of loan contracts 
offered by the different programs. The effective rate thus represents an upper bound on the returns 
on loans. Most intermediaries would not achieve this ideal return. 
In general, Indonesian RFis lend for comparatively short periods, in order to more 
frequently monitor repayment. The range of the most common repayment terms goes from 
12 to 43 weeks (Table 5). To ease the recording of transaction, in most cases installments 
are credited in the following manner: the first one as interest, the second one as mandatory 
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savings, and ten additional installments as amortization. 7 For this reason, several RFis 
(KURK, BKK, KUD, and BKD) have chosen the 12-week alternative as their most common 
repayment term. Compulsory savings (that augment effective interest rates) are required 
by all the systems, except the BRI-unit desa. The latter is the only system, on the other 
hand, to require collateral. 
III. Determinants of Success 
This generalized high degree of success of Indonesian RF1s may be mostly attributed 
to factors that reflect regularities in the design of these systems. This paper surveys the 
design elements instrumental for this success. Before addressing this task, the hospitable 
environment in which these intermediaries have functioned is briefly described. 
(a) The Environment 
Indonesia's dynamic economy and stable macroeconomic and political environment 
have presented an auspicious climate for financial intermediation. The country has 
experienced comparatively high rates of growth of output. Numerous profitable 
opportunities for investment have emerged, as the infrastructure has been developed, 
domestic markets have become more integrated, and the liberalization of trade policies has 
widened opportunities for exports to world markets. Permeating the whole economy, this 
dynamism has resulted in high and growing demands for financial services. Economic 
7 There may be some incentive advantages to credit the last installment, rather than the 
first one, as an interest payment. To the extent to which profit-sharing arrangements are 
based on profits, leaving the earning of income for the last payment may increase incentives 
to collect. 
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activity has been particularly intense in the densely populated islands, such as Java and Bali. 
There, high density of population and a well-developed infrastructure have allowed RFis to 
easily dilute their fixed costs and to rapidly achieve equilibrium positions (at least zero 
losses). 
This process of rapid output growth has been accompanied by the liberalization of 
financial markets, an expanding supply of financial services, and the emergence of 
substantial competition in the sector (Cole and Slade, 1990). Financial deepening has been 
further facilitated by a stable macroeconomic performance (no significant domestic inflation 
or devaluation of the rupiah) and by political stability. The effective presence of 
government at all administrative levels, a high degree of social cohesion, and the importance 
of traditional social structures bas offered effective mechanisms for financial contract 
enforcement. 
There is no doubt that the stable macroeconomic environment in which these R.Fis 
have evolved and operated has been an important ingredient in their aggregate success. 
Macroeconomic stability, although very important, is not by itself a sufficient condition, 
however, for an above-average performance of a significant number of organizational types 
that deal with marginal clientele. There are many examples of credit programs and 
organizations with a poor performance in countries with highly stable macroeconomic condi-
tions or political environments and Indonesia bas not been an exception. Instances of 
Indonesian failure have been the Bimbingan Massa/ (BIMAS) credit program and some of 
the Koperasi Unit Desa (KUD) operations. 
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(b) The Design of Successful Rural Financial Intermediaries 
As the auspicious general climate in which these RF1s function cannot explain, by 
itself, their success, it is necessary to identify regularities, observable across Indonesian 
successful intermediaries, that are absent in most other developing countries as well as in 
those Indonesian RFis that have failed. 
The success of RFis in Indonesia has been the outcome of strong combinations of 
the factors described below. These individual ingredients of success represent, in tum, the 
specific implementation of an underlying concern with the viability of the organizations and, 
thereby, with their permanency over time. This objective has resulted in the generalized 
adoption of most elements of a complete and appropriate design by of the RFis. This 
design has provided the economic agents involved in their operation (managers and clients) 
with both the incentives to behave in a manner conducive to success and the opportunities 
to do so. Incentives and opportunities are necessary conditions for the success of 
organizations and, therefore, of the credit programs that they are supposed to carry out. 
The relevant Indonesian authorities have recognized that it is more useful, in terms 
of development, to promote organizations that provide financial services at market prices, 
in a permanent fashion, than to sponsor short-lived, subsidized credit programs that only 
have a transitory impact. The question of why this has been the case begs an answer. 
Nevertheless, the answer to why the Indonesian authorities have had the incentives and the 
skill to design and implement such programs, while similar authorities in other countries 
have not, is beyond the scope of this paper. Instead, the paper deals with design issues 
about the organizations, taking as given the objective of self-sustainability. 
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IV. The Rural Financial Markets Paradox 
The almost endemic lack of access on the part of marginal clientele to formal 
financial services should be explained, at least in part, by an apparent paradox. Those 
agents who have inexpensive access to information and monitoring mechanisms, to ensure 
reasonable repayment rates, may not have enough resources or may be too risk averse to 
provide widespread financial services in their locality; while those who do have the resources 
and the necessary attitudes toward risk have no access, at a reasonable cost, to the required 
information and monitoring tools. 8 
As long as this separation between the required access to information and the 
necessary resources -including attitudes toward risk and opportunities for diversification-
is present, there are limited opportunities for the widespread availability of financial and 
insurance services in the rural areas. In addition, in most developing countries there are 
policy distortions that make rural clientele unattractive. That is, some formal intermediaries 
may not want to provide financial services to small rural clientele because regulatory 
constraints render such activities unprofitable (Gonzalez-Vega, 1976). Such policies may 
increase the problem significantly. 
8 Given attitudes toward risk, the willingness to invest depends on the opportunity to 
move resources in space and the implied ability to diversify. It is clear that agents with 
access to local information would lose such advantage when dealing with agents located 
elsewhere. Therefore, unwillingness to lend to individuals exposed to covariant risks (i.e., 
in the same village) may reflect these constraints. 
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V. The Main Design Elements of Successful RFis in Indonesia 
A constellation of mutually reinforcing design features are key determinants of the 
success of Indonesian RFI. These features, which have been adopted independently of the 
specific ownership arrangements, are examined below.9 
(a) The Information Component 
An effective solution of the rural financial market paradox has been one of the 
fundamental ingredients of the success of Indonesian RFis. These organizations have 
fostered the interaction of both types of agents, those who have the information and those 
who have the resources, in the provision of financial services for the rural poor. Such 
interaction has been at the foundation of other reported instances of success. The use of 
group lending and joint liability by the Grameen Bank in Bangladesh and by PRODEM in 
Bolivia are nothing else but attempts to solve the formal lenders problems in rural and 
informal credit markets: it is too costly to gather information on the likelihood of a 
borrower defaulting on a loan, it is too costly to monitor the actions of the borrower once 
a loan has been granted, and quite often it is too costly, if not impossible, to enforce loan 
contracts. Group lending (joint liability) attempts to enlist the efforts of the borrower's 
peers (those who have information) in reducing these problems, by imposing a utility cost 
on them (e.g., denied future access to loans) if the borrower defaults. On the other hand, 
it is necessary to stress that group lending is but one (costly) option among several possible 
strategies to solve this problem. 
9 There is a network of branches of a large development bank owned by the national 
government (BRI-unit desa), as well as provincial government, village, and client ownership. 
As indicated, private banks have also adopted these features. 
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Several layers of the Indonesian government (those who have the resources) have 
intervened, rather successfully, in the country's rural financial markets in an attempt to solve 
the problem of lack of formal financial services, by establishing networks of semi-
independent, locally-operated RFis. The Indonesian government has recruited, for that 
purpose, the services of local agents who have a comparative advantage in gathering 
information about borrowers, monitoring their actions, and enforcing loan contracts. 
-
The borrower screening technology used in Indonesia is simply personal knowledge 
of the borrower and/ or the requirement of a reference from some local authority (e.g., 
village lurah) who possesses such knowledge. Most loans are provided on the basis of 
character references alone and do not require collateral. 
It is widely agreed that the most important non-financial costs for a bank are incurred 
(and its comparative advantages are developed) while processing information about the 
likelihood that individual borrowers will pay their loans as promised. In order to accomplish 
this goal, traditional banks have developed sophisticated techniques of loan analysis. These 
techniques become prohibitively expensive when banks deal with small loans, because the 
associated expenses tend to be invariant to loan size. Moreover, some of these techniques 
could not be utilized, most of the time, when supplying credit to small borrowers, even if 
the RFis wanted to do so, simply because they rely on data that are not available in that 
segment of the market (e.g., audited financial statements). 
Screening costs are, on the other hand, an increasing function of the distance between 
the financial intermediary and the borrower. Here we refer not only to geographic distance, 
but to any type of distance (ethnic, cultural, occupational). Some financial intermediaries 
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specialize in the provision of services to particular sectors of economic activity, thus 
developing a comparative advantage (low cost) in serving them. Other agents possess 
information or have access to special contract enforcement mechanisms within specific social 
or occupational groups (Esguerra, 1993). 
The adoption of character references as a borrower screening technology by many 
Indonesian RFis has important implications in terms of operating costs.10 Character-based 
lending is a comparatively inexpensive technique for two reasons. First, local information 
about a borrower is a sunk cost, in the sense that it is an asset that does not have a value 
outside the local financial market (it may actually become an entry barrier enjoyed by the 
local moneylender). Second, such information is acquired in a slow fashion, the only needed 
expenditure resulting from having been in the location for a sufficiently long period of time. 
Oearly, this advantage may be obtained by an outside lender if management is hired among 
local residents or if it has access to reliable sources of local information. More importantly, 
character-based lending seems to have been comparatively efficient in avoiding costly 
mistakes in assessing the probability of loan repayment.11 These mistakes are translated 
into highly expensive loan defaults. 
10 Here we analyze the benefits, in terms of operating costs, from access to a screening 
technology based on local knowledge. It is assumed that this technology is effective -as has 
been the case~~ in preventing delinquency and loan losses. The additional issue of why local 
knowledge, character references, and the use of informal and/ or traditional institutions to 
enforce credit contracts have been so effective to prevent loan losses is analyzed in detail 
below. 
11 It seems that the local character reference has been more efficient than alternative 
screening techniques. Obviously, different technologies are not necessarily exclusive and 
important complementarities may exist. The likelihood of repayment depends on several 
variables, including monitoring after the loan has been granted. 
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{b) The Agency Problem, Incentives, and Local Decisions 
The recruitment of informed/local agents replaces, however, one problem with 
another. The information/ enforcement problem now becomes an agency problem. That 
is, the formal lender has to ensure that the local agents have, in fact, access to the necessary 
information, and that they will behave consistently with the owner's interests. It is possible, 
actually likely, that the agents will shirk with respect to the amount of effort necessary to 
collect loans or that they will collude with borrowers in the screening process. This may 
occur despite the comparative advantage of the local agent because he has to incur in a 
positive amount of effort to gather the information, monitor loans, and enforce contracts. 
The level of effort actually exerted cannot be easily observed, however, by the formal lender 
(owner). It is clear that incentive problems may arise. 
An information asymmetry is at the heart of any agency problem. In the Indonesian 
case, the information problem implied by this agency relationship has been less severe -or 
easier to solve-- than the information problem associated with lending to a rural clientele. 
The solution has been a system of incentives (performance-based remunerations and 
efficiency wages) that has induced a behavior, on the part of RFI managers (the local 
agents), consistent with the financial health of the unit (compatible incentives). 
The information/enforcement problem of formal lenders (i.e., the layers of the 
government) in rural markets thus evolved into a problem of verification of the performance 
of management and the corresponding units. This should be an easier task than to use a 
development bank located in Jakarta or any one of the provincial capitals in order to 
disburse and recover individual rural loans. In the case of some Indonesian RFis, the 
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formal lender's information problem has been devalued to the verification of the profits of 
individual units, which operate as profit/loss centers. Profits are comparatively inexpensive 
to verify and have been interpreted as a sufficient statistic for management efforts.12 
The management of these successful RFis has been induced to behave consistently 
with the financial viability of the organizations by a system of incentives constructed on 
performance-based compensation schemes (e.g., profit sharing, collection fees) and on 
management's quasi-equity contributions in the form of efficiency earnings. To a large 
extent the managers of the RFis have been made co-owners of their corresponding unit. 
Thus, agents who posses or have access to advantages of information, monitoring, and 
enforcement are subject to utility gains or losses depending on the performance of their 
units. 
In effect, all successful Indonesian RFis have established a management 
compensation scheme based on performance. Most of the schemes observed consist of a 
total remuneration that results from the combination of a fixed salary plus a bonus or 
incentive payment that is a function of some observable variable, such as profits or loan 
installments recovered. Similar compensation mechanisms are widely used by private firms 
all over the world. What is innovative in the Indonesian case is the almost universal 
adoption of such mechanisms even when the ostensible or formal owner of a particular RFI 
12 Qearly, management may have incentives to misrepresent financial performance 
(state falsification). Comparatively simple auditing techniques can be used to reduce this 
problem. On the other band, the variable profits may be clouded with realizations of risks 
that are covariant for all borrowers. In the Indonesian case, however, this would require 
a natural disaster or a problem of similar magnitude, due to the high diversification 
practiced by borrowers and, thereby, of the RFI units. 
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is any one of the multiple layers of the public sector (e.g., provincial or village governments). 
This phenomenon of public servants enjoying performance-based monetary incentives is 
rather unusual, if non-existent, in Latin America or the United States. 
Although the particular formulae as well as the variables involved in the computation 
of the incentives vary across organizations, the adoption of these schemes implies the 
recognition of and explicit attempt to reduce the principal-agent problems that appear with 
delegation. 13 In the Indonesian case, the owners of financial institutions, whoever they may 
be, have recognized that, when there is a separation of management from ownership 
problems arise, as the objective functions of the two may not necessarily coincide. 
On the other hand, the total compensation earned by management and other 
staff of the successful RFis seems to have been, on the average, significantly higher than the 
remuneration for which equivalent employees would be willing to perform the same 
functions. Gonzalez-Vega and Chaves (1992) report that all RFI staff members interviewed 
declared to be more than satisfied with their current salary and future compensation (e.g., 
pension plan), and that they did not believe they would be able to obtain an equivalent job 
neither would they want to. This strongly suggests that efficiency wages are being paid. 
Efficiency wages is a general term to denote the salary paid to an employee while 
equivalent workers would be willing to perform exactly the same tasks for a lower wage. 
13 The separation of management and ownership is a particularly severe problem in the 
case of public enterprises, where the concept of ownership is completely diffused. The 
ostensible owners of most public institutions are the citizens of a particular country. The 
immense majority of them do not exercise any control over the organization. Even if they 
wanted to, they cannot influence the organization's performance and do not receive the 
dividends or direct retribution (usually losses) that result from this performance. 
21 
Some authors argue that such payments may occur when it is difficult (expensive) to observe 
(supervise) the activities or amount of effort provided by an agent and/ or when the actions 
of the agent (or lack of them) might impose a severe cost on the principal. Moreover, in 
the Indonesian context the punishment tools for substandard employee performance 
-
available to RFI owners are limited to suspension, demotion, or firing of employees.14 
Under these conditions, employers must find mechanisms to elicit adequate effort 
from their employees. One of the ways for doing so is to raise wages above the opportunity 
cost of workers. 1bis increases, in turn, the cost of job loss and encourages workers to put 
forth adequate effort and behavior.15 That is, the principal may find it in its interest to pay 
a higher than a market·clearing salary to its agents, so as to increase their cost of being 
fired. 1bis cost is equivalent to the difference between the present discounted value of the 
salaries from the position and of the expected salaries in alternative occupations. Oearly, 
for the principal to find efficiency wages attractive, the increased expenditure must be 
outweighed by the increased productivity of greater effort and/ or reduced costs of undesired 
behavior (e.g., shirking and fraud). 
14 In Indonesia, imprisonment, resort to tort or contract law for redress are simply not 
available options for most forms of management malfeasance. 
15 One alternative and more direct method would be for workers to post performance 
bonds at the time of hiring, which would be forfeited if the employee is caught misbehaving. 
1bis, however, is not feasible, because employees, particularly early in their working lives, 
face wealth constraints and lack the liquidity required to post bond This problem may have 
been solved in Indonesian RFis by a combination of efficiency wages and other employment 
arrangements that may implicitly perform bonding functions, such as upward·sloping age· 
earnings profiles (seniority raises), pensions, and internal promotion ladders. 
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The idea behind this hypothesis is that the management of Indonesia's RFis tend to 
value their jobs considerably because their current positions, earnings profiles, and other 
employment arrangements cannot be easily replaced. These benefits act as a quasi-equity 
contribution or as a posted bond on the part of management. The result is that their 
behavior is more prudent and industrious than otherwise.16 
This is an additional feature of the incentive system (profit sharing) described above; 
not only do agents have a direct stake in the successful performance of the organization, as 
to have an incentive to make the right decisions, but in addition they value their positions 
more than any other alternative job in the relevant portion of the labor market. 
In most other developing countries, the management of RFis (public development 
banks and non-government organizations) are paid little in comparison to what they might 
earn performing similar functions and with similar responsibilities at another firm. This has 
caused RFis to hire personnel who do not value their position highly, and leave as soon as 
an opening becomes available, taking with them the experience accumulated in their job. 
Also, when RFis pay comparatively low salaries, they select their management from a pool 
of applicants who respond to job offerings that pay a salary below the market average for 
similar positions. 
The lesson from Indonesia is that it may be profitable for RFis to pay comparatively 
high salaries, not only to attract qualified personnel, but also to make sure that they value 
16 Efficiency wages are particular to a given individual, her current salary and her 
alternative expected income. A salary level that may be high enough so that an individual 
behaves in the desired manner may be insufficient for another individual or too low for a 
different occupation. 
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their current positions enough to behave in the desired manner. This is required because 
of the nature of the tasks they must perform and the difficulty to monitor their actions at 
a non-prohibitive cost. 
The substitutability between monitoring and efficiency wages is not perfect. Thus, 
the use of efficiency wages would not allow for the total elimination of internal control 
efforts, because, for these compensation levels to work, there must be a credible probability 
of wrongful or negligent behavior being detected. The effectiveness of efficiency wages 
resides in the fact that being fired represents a punishment, as it is unlikely that the agent 
will find a similar salary in the marketP No level of punishment is deterrent enough if the 
probability of being caught and, therefore, punished is zero. 
In the Indonesian case, the combination of profit-based management compensation 
schemes and efficiency wages implies that managers are, for these purposes, co-owners of 
the individual units. They have become residual claimants -of sorts- of the profits 
generated by their particular unit. While performance-based payments make them cJaimants 
of part of the profits, efficiency wages act as quasi-equity contributions on their part, 
implying a loss when the organization goes bankrupt or when they are caught acting 
improperly.18 That is, management has a pecuniary stake in both the up and down sides of 
the profit distribution of the organization. 
17 It is obvious that the expected value of the punishment must be greater than the 
expected benefits from wrongful behavior, in order to discourage it. 
18 Clearly, efficiency wages act as quasi-equity contributions when there is a credible 
threat that the unit will not be bailed out or that management will be replaced in case of 
bankruptcy. Also, the probability of being caught in case of improper behavior must be 
positive. 
24 
(c) Decentralization of Decisions 
The use of performance-based incentives and efficiency wages would not serve any 
purpose if the agents (managers) did not possess discretionary powers over performance-
relevant variables. 
In the case of the successful RFis observed there is a wide variability concerning the 
decisions that their management can make independently from the owners or the regulators. 
In all cases, nevertheless, the managers have had the responsibility to screen loan applicants 
and to decide whether to grant the loans and for what amounts. No targeting of loans that 
would take this authority away exists. In most cases the corresponding layers of the 
government have not imposed any severe restriction on the units with respect to their 
financial policies. 
Relevant variables, such as effective interest rates or the use of loan funds, were not 
dictated by the government and/ or were not effectively supervised. In most cases these two 
options are equivalent. The most important exception are the BRI-unit desa, which belong 
to a more centralized and traditional banking structure. The remaining RFis are, for all 
practical purposes, collections of independent units that share general institutional 
characteristics. For these other organizations, the implementation of general guidelines with 
respect to financial policies has been far from uniform across units. For instance, effective 
interest rates may vary within RFI systems because compensatory balance requirements are 
not uniform across units. 
This relative autonomy has allowed the units to adapt -within certain bounds- to 
their specific environments and has avoided the costs to the government of an otherwise 
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expensive, and very likely ineffective, supervision. The only supervision actually exercised 
has responded to internal control issues, which in this context has meant efforts to avoid that 
management divert funds for their own benefit (corruption) and verification of the accuracy 
of financial statements. A good combination of an ex ante probability of discovering 
wrongful behavior with sufficient ex post punishment would help to prevent corruption. In 
any case, to determine whether the funds have been stolen and/or financial statements are 
incorrect is considerably less expensive than to check for compliance with several policy 
regulations and guidelines on fund uses. 
(d) Adequate Financial Policies 
A critical component of this successful design has been the adoption of sensible 
financial policies, adopted with the purpose of protecting the viability of the units. In 
particular, the interest rates charged have been highly positive and consistent with the small 
size and high risks of the credit transactions. As reported in Table 4, the effective annual 
interest rates charged vary from 315 to 84.4 percent per year. These rates are high in real 
terms, as in the past ten years Indonesia has experienced single-digit inflation. 
Bounds on contractual nominal interest rates set by the corresponding layer of the 
government have in some cases reflected an attempt to limit the monopolistic powers of RFI 
managers. Such limits have worked, however, only to a certain extent Some units have 
increased the effective rates charged on loans by demanding, in some cases even 
confiscating, compulsory savings that function as compensatory balances. The critical fact 
is that the effective interest rates charged have allowed for the real growth of loan balances. 
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(e) Subsidies without Dependence 
Another critical component of this overall design has been that the subsidies involved 
have not created organizational dependency and have been granted to the RF1 itself, not 
its clientele. This has also contributed to the financial viability of the RFis. The majority 
of these quasi-public RFis received an initial endowment of resources to start their 
operations. Although the financial cost of this initial capitalization and of the retained ear-
nings might represent an important implicit subsidy, in Indonesia it did not create depen-
dency on the external source of funds on the part of the intermediary. This has been so 
because the subsidies were one-time loans and/ or direct transfers, in the form of seed 
capital, not followed by the expectation of additional injections of resources. No operating 
subsidies have been granted. 
The advantage of this approach has been that the organizations have been able to 
plan on a solid basis, rather than depend on annual budgets of outside resources and 
become vulnerable to the swings associated with such funding, linked either to the mood of 
politicians or the availability of fiscal resources in a particular year. The lesson learned is 
that if a subsidy is going to be granted to the intermediary, it may be better to give it as a 
one-shot and as a lump-sum transfer.19 
It is important to stress that the one-shot subsidy strategy must be credible. This 
means that the RFI decisionmakers must believe that future bail outs or replenishment of 
19 The size of the subsidy may have important consequences, particularly on deposit 
mobilization. For a full discussion of this issue see Gonzalez-Vega and Chaves (1992, pp. 
89-90). 
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losses will not take place.20 This requires a firm stand on the part of the donor. Although 
a subsidy may not be required in every situation of rural financial market development or 
RFI strengthening, when it may be necessary or if it is to be granted, it may be optimal to 
provide it in a credible once-in-the-organization's-life basis. 
Another feature of the subsidies granted to the successful RFis is that they have been 
directed to the organization itself and not to its borrowers. In other countries as well as in 
-
the case of non-successful Indonesian RFis, the subsidies have been captured by the final 
borrowers, through subsidized interest rates and/ or loan losses. In the successful RFis, the 
subsidies have been mostly capitalized in the form of retained earnings. This has improved 
the viability of the organization, not only because of increased solvency, but also because 
of its consequences on the behavior of management and borrowers, who have perceived the 
unit as a permanent institution. Increased equity may imply higher profit-based payments 
for management and larger loan amounts for borrowers. The financial health of the 
intermediary becomes of great importance for both groups of agents. Another advantage 
of this capitalization of subsidies is that it makes possible, in the future, to privatize the 
organization. 1bis is not possible when the subsidies have already been relinquished to the 
borrowers. 
A key component of the implicit subsidy has been competent technical assistance, 
free of charge, on general policies and procedures, that has not created dependency, because 
20 From the point of view of management, the credible commitment not to bail the 
organization out is equivalent to a credible threat that if it experiences financial problems, 
management will be replaced. That is, no second chance will be offered to management. 
An equivalent strategy may not be easy to implement for borrowers. 
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no support for local staff salaries has been involved.21 In other countries, such assistance 
has caused overstaffing, and the organizations have found it difficult to cut back in payroll 
expenses when the donors leave. 
(f) Extent of the Intervention and the Fixed Cost Structure 
-
The design of these RFis has implied that the extent of the intervention has been 
adequate. Actually, one of the lessons from the success of these RFis is that government 
interventions must be proportional to the magnitude of the problems they attempt to solve. 
Successful government interventions do not have to be massive undertakings that imply large 
fixed-cost structures (e.g., elegant buildings, expensive payrolls). RFis should not be 
burdened with a cost structure that is not compatible with the comparatively small size of 
the markets where they function. When there are costs that are fixed in nature, an 
associated minimum volume of transactions is required to support an organization. 22 
The income statements of these RFis have not been burdened with fixed-cost 
structures disproportionate to the size of the market being served. The problem that they 
were asked to solve was one of access to credit at the village level. An organization with 
dimensions compatible to that of the village was therefore created. The traditional 
21 This has been the case of the AID-sponsored Financial Institutions Development 
Project. 
22 Oearly, when fixed costs do not exist, costs of operation are positive only when 
services are actually provided. This is the nature of the operation of most moneylenders 
who are not fully devoted to the activity. Full-time moneylenders, on the other hand, have 
as their fixed cost the alternative returns of their investments plus the opportunity cost of 
their time. These tend to be low fixed-cost structures, when compared to the fixed costs of 
an organization. 
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approach would probably have been to create a development bank, headquartered in the 
provincial capital, with a large branch network at the desa level23 
Some of these RFis (e.g., the BKK-CJ) are located at the subdistrict level (keca-
matan ), but operate a system of village posts or ambulatory banking services to reach some 
of the villages within their area of influence. Teams of usually two employees visit the 
villages -once a week- to provide basic banking services. This is an example of how the 
fixed costs of operating a RFI unit are diluted among several villages. These ambulatory 
banking services reduce average costs for the RFI and transaction costs for its borrowers. 
In other cases, the systems were explicitly designed to minimize fixed costs. For instance, 
at the (BKD) salary payments, usually a large component of total fixed costs, are avoided, 
since the retribution to their management is entirely a variable cost (i.e., a proportional fee 
on loan recovery). 
Furthermore, the origins and evolution of these RFis show that gradual growth is a 
good approach to institution building. There has been a process of trial and error, in which 
errors have not been extremely expensive, while corrections have been implemented with 
comparative ease. When organizations and/or structures are born large, mistakes are very 
costly, sometimes costly enough as to make them disappear, and corrections are difficult to 
implement 
23 The BRI·unit desa system is a successful centralized system. Although each unit desa 
is a profit/loss center, it does not reach the village level and it lends to larger borrowers. 
In some cases, it uses ambulatory services to reach below the sub-district. 
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(g) Non-traditional Collateral, Borrowers' Recognition, and Enforcement 
Emphasis on the viability of RFis has implied that the organizations have been able 
to provide agile and efficient financial -mostly credit-- services to their clients. The rapid 
disbursement and low transaction costs of loans and the possibility to pledge non-traditional 
forms of collateral such as the value of the borrower's reputation (character reference) have 
made these RFis valuable organizations for their clientele. On the other hand, their policies 
(high interest rates) and design (manager co-ownership) have induced borrowers to perceive 
them as permanent organizations credibly committed to collect loans. Both the benefits of 
protecting the relationship with the RFI and the costs of default are high. This has further 
increased, in turn, the value of the borrower's reputation with respect to a particular unit 
The result have been comparatively low levels of delinquency, as borrowers have pledged 
an expensive llb,ostage• as collateral for their loans. 24 
High repayment rates may not be completely explained, however, by the loss of the 
value of the relationship with a particular RFI. There may be other significant costs for the 
borrowers of falling in arrears and of not repaying their loans. Despite the importance of 
the bank-client relationship, this may not be an entirely acceptable explanation in the areas 
where there is strong competition and intermediaries do not share -at least directly- their 
borrowers' credit history. Intense competition may imply a high probability of obtaining a 
24 The value of reputation or the value of the relationship with the intermediary may 
serve as a hostage pledged by the borrower. Default on the loan would have as 
consequence the suspension of a valuable financial relationship with a particular 
intermediary and/or a market-wide loss of reputation. Access to financial markets has a 
value. There will be default if the benefit of repudiating a debt is larger than this value of 
access. Obviously, both variables are endogenous in the sense that they are affected, for 
instance, by the efforts of the lender to collect and by communication among lenders. 
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loan from another RFI, while the absence of cross-information may decrease the probability 
of being screened out by the new RFI because of defaults somewhere else. This suggests 
that there may be, in addition to these incentives, important social and economic pressures 
from local traditional and political structures to force compliance with credit contracts in 
the rural areas of Indonesia. 
Regardless of the formal ownership of the RFis, they have incorporated or used the 
traditional hierarchical structures of the community where they operate in order to increase 
the probability of repayment. This is particularly important for the ex post reductions of 
loan delinquency (pure enforcement).25 Most Indonesian lending organizations use the 
political chief of the village (kepala desa) or clan leader (lwah) to induce loan repayment 
when the borrowers fall in arrears. In effect, all RFis visited reported that they had never 
taken any costumer to court, even in the few cases when formal collateral had been 
required. The managers interviewed had serious doubts regarding the probability of 
enforcing, at a reasonable cost, credit contracts through the formal legal system. 
This issue of lack of formal enforceability of credit contracts gives rise to several 
important questions. The first one is whether the character reference provided by the local 
government officials is in fact just that: a reference, or if it represents a way to create 
accountability, from those officials, to enlist their assistance in the recovery of loans in 
arrears. One should not expect that a lurah or kepala desa would have significant informa-
25 A pure enforcement problem occurs when a borrower repudiates a debt even though 
she has enough resources to canceL 
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tional advantages over the manager of a given RFI, who has lived and made loans for a long 
period of time in the same locality, as well. 
The role of the lurah may be important, therefore, as an instrument of ex post 
contract enforcement. Since the lurah earns, in most cases, a fee on each character 
reference, the function of providing the reference represents a personal asset, worth for the 
lurah the present discounted value of future fees. When the lurah has provided a mistaken 
er ante estimation of the probability of repayment, he would have a strong incentive for 
exerting pressure on the borrower, in order to recover the delinquent amount and maintain 
his credibility. 
Another interesting possibility is that the lurah may be acting as an indigenous credit 
rating agency, as well. Although the RFis do not share information about the 
creditworthiness of individual applicants, such information may be accumulated by the lurah. 
This may be the case because the lurah is involved in enforcing credit contracts for several 
RFis. He has information, therefore, about those borrowers who have defaulted. On the 
other hand, every RFI in the region requires loan applicants to provide a character 
reference from the lurah. These two elements may imply that those borrowers who have 
repudiated credit contracts will be screened out of the loan portfolios of other RFis because 
they will not obtain the required character reference.26 It is clear that the system requires 
26 It is important to note that the lurah and the kepala desa are not elected officials. 
They are appointed by superior layers of the provincial government. This implies that it is 
unlikely that political considerations (patronage) may distort the character reference 
provided by such officials. Of course, it is possible that collusion with a borrower (e.g., 
bribery, nepotism) may influence the character reference. Such instances seem to be the 
exception, however. 
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of both dimensions of the lurah 's involvement; the ex ante character reference and ex post 
involvement in case of delinquency. 
VI. Conclusion 
-
The Indonesian success in the provision of financial services to the rural poor is in 
itself an important accomplishment worthy of analysis. Moreover, the Indonesian experience 
is interesting beyond the range of rural finance. The lessons learned may be an important 
input, for instance, for institution building in regions such as Eastern Europe, the former 
Soviet Union, and the developing world, where governments and international agencies are 
confronting similar questions and challenges. 
This experience may shed light on the reform of government-owned financial 
intermediaries and on improvements of their performance under rather weak mechanisms 
for the formal enforcement of loan contracts. There is no question that the ultimate 
objective would generally be the development of a fully-private financial system operating 
under appropriate regulatory and supervisory frameworks. However, this goal may not be 
attained soon enough while, for instance, reforming the financial markets of formerly 
centralized economies and/ or when improving access of marginal clientele to financial 
services in developing countries. 
One important lesson from the Indonesian experience is that if the government 
and/ or donor agencies are going to be, or are already, involved in providing assistance to 
or participating in the ownership of financial intermediaries, there are important and clear 
principles to follow in order to maximize the benefits and minimize the costs of such 
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intervention in financial markets.27 It should be recognized that the design of the 
organizations that undertake financial intermediation matters, and it matters a lot. Although 
very important, an appropriate macroeconomic environment may not be sufficient. 
Here we refer to the make up of the organizations themselves, not merely to the 
design of the specific credit programs. Usually, program design efforts have been confined 
to the allocation of specific amounts of resources for a particular purpose and the choice 
of target beneficiaries. This is not sufficient and is frequently counterproductive. 
The design of an organization that will supply financial intermediation services is vital 
because this is what, in the last instance, will determine its performance and, hence, the 
success or failure of the program. Institution building programs can •take the horse to the 
water, but cannot force it to drink. • That is, although adequate financial policies and 
techniques are necessary, they will never be properly implemented if they do not respond 
to the interests of those managing the intermediary institutions. These techniques may be 
taught to them, but they will never be adopted if they essentially contradict the existing 
structure of incentives. 
The implicit paradigm in the analysis is the recognition that the actual performance 
of an organization, even of economies at large, results mainly from choices made by 
individuals. It is the managers of financial intermediaries who decide, for instance, to exert 
a low or high effort to collect loans; while borrowers have to decide whether to repay or not. 
27 This paper does not discuss the implicit and vital question of whether the government 
should intervene in the operations of financial markets. Full discussions of this issue are 
found in Chaves and Gonzalez-Vega (1992), and Besley (1992). Here we refer to general 
principles that would maximize (or minimize) the net benefit (or loss) of such inteiVention. 
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All these development-relevant decisions are the result of individuals maximizing their 
objective functions under constraints. These constraints, besides the traditional ones, include 
institutional restrictions and transaction --including information- costs. 
It should be clear, therefore, that in the end the performance of an organization, and 
of any development program, depends on the willingness (incentives) and ability (con-
straints) of the individuals involved.28 That is, success -however defined- may occur only 
when it is in someone's best interest and when such interest may be pursued, given the 
existing constraints and environment. 
28 It is obvious that there are events beyond the control of economic agents. Natural 
disasters may imply the failure of any development program. 
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